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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This brief is submitted both in support of the appeal
filed by Inteltech and Norton as their reply brief pursuant to
Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in response
to the cross appeal that has been filed by plaintiff herein and
is submitted pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

The argument portion of the brief is

divided into Section A which relates to the Inteltech appeal and
to Section B which relates to the plaintiff's appeal.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. as an appeal from a final order
and judgment of a District Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant accepts plaintiff's Statement of Issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is an appeal from an Order granting Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) in favor of plaintiff.

The

standard of review is found in the cases of King v. Fereday , 739
P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) and Gustaveson v. Gregg. 655 P.2d 693 (Utah
1982).

On appeal, all evidence and reasonable inferences from

evidence supporting the defendant must be accepted as true and
all conflicts in evidence which tend to disprove the defendant's

case must be disregarded.

The trial court's granting of JNOV may

only be affirmed if there is a total absence of competent
evidence supporting the verdict.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Defendant accepts plaintiff's statement of
determinitive authority.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This action arises from a worker's compensation claim

filed by plaintiff's husband, James Turner.

The claim was

adjusted by General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (GAB).

GAB became

suspicious of the validity of the claim and employed Inteldex
Corporation (Inteltech) to investigate.
An undercover investigation was conducted.

Inteltech

investigators appeared at Mr. Turner's worker's compensation
hearing and testified regarding what they had learned.

Both Mr.

and Mrs. Turner affirmed that the testimony given by the
Inteltech investigators at that hearing was true.
The administrative law judge ruled against Mr. Turner
at the worker's compensation hearing.

Mr. and Mrs. Turner then

sued GAB, Inteltech, and certain Inteltech employees.

2

B.

Course of Proceedings,
Defendant accepts plaintiff's statement of the course

of proceedings,
C.

Statement of Facts.
Inteltech incorporates its factual statement filed with

its initial brief herein, and notes for the Court that plaintiff
has not disputed any of the factual citations included therein.
Inteltech disputes several of the statements of "fact"
included in plaintiff's responsive brief.

They are as follows:

(1) At paragraph 19 of her "Factual Statement"
contained in her brief, plaintiff claims that she missed work and
that she paid $20 to a babysitter as a consequence of the
investigation.

Inteltech does not dispute that plaintiff

testified to unspecified income loss and to a $20 expense.
However, these were not established as facts at trial.
did not believe plaintiff's testimony.

The jury

Even Judge Wilkinson who

granted the JNOV in this case, did not find that any loss of
income had been established.

His award for out of pocket loss

was $20. As pointed out in Inteltech's initial brief, there is
substantial question about the credibility of plaintiff's
testimony which justified the jury's determination that any
expense was either not incurred, or could easily have been
avoided by plaintiff.
3

(2) At paragraph 20 of plaintiff's statement of
"facts", she claims that she suffered emotional and mental pain
because of the Inteltech investigation.

This fact is also

disputed and was not found to exist by the jury.

Plaintiff's

testimony in this regard was contradicted by her own husband as
well as by her psychiatric records.
Tr. 380-381.)

(Tr. 197-198, Tr. 385-389,

Plaintiff's argument in her brief that her husband

didn't know her true feelings is again based upon her testimony
which the jury did not believe.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
(Section A.

Support of Inteltech Appeal)
POINT A-l

THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
CONSEQUENTLY, NO JNOV MAY BE GRANTED.
The Jury in this case unanimously held that plaintiff
had failed to prove any claim for invasion of privacy or for
fraud.

There was competent evidence to support this

determination.

The trial judge is precluded from substituting

his own feelings from those of the jury with regard to issues of
fact.

Unfortunately in this case that is what Judge Wilkinson

did.

4

A,

Invasion of Privacy Claim.
An invasion of privacy requires an intrusion into the

private concerns of plaintiffs which was substantial and would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.

These are issues of

fact which are uniquely within the province of the jury in
judging what constitutes "substantial" and what constitutes
"highly offensive."

The jury in this case found against

plaintiff.
Plaintiff has attempted in her responsive brief to
claim that the circumstances justify a determination as a matter
of law that the action was substantial and highly offensive.
There simply is no case support for that proposition.

The cases

cited by plaintiff make clear that these issues are reserved for
jury determination and that a court is not to substitute its own
judgment for that of the jury.
B.

A Jury's Verdict of No Cause of Action Fraud Was Well
Supported.
Plaintiff's primary failure of proof regarding her

fraud claim was her lack of any pecuniary damage.

While it is

true that plaintiff herself testified to an unspecified loss of
income and to an approximate $20 expense for a babysitter, the
jury simply did not believe her.

There were numerous

contradictions in plaintiff's testimony and the testimony of
5

other witnesses.

Additionally, evidence from plaintiff's

psychiatric records demonstrated her inability to testify
accurately with regard to these issues.

Finally, plaintiff

offered no explanation as to why she did not cancel the
babysitter and thus save the expense after the Inteltech shopping
spree had been similarly cancelled.
Plaintiff's evidence was scanty at best and certainly
did not meet a clear and convincing standard or even the
preponderance of evidence standard.
In addition, a review of the facts of this case shows
that it is not a fraud case.

Fraud involves a transaction

between parties akin to contract.

In this case, the only

transaction involved was the promise of free products in exchange
for plaintiff's willingness to use the products and meet with the
investigator.
promised.

Plaintiff received everything that she was

The substance of plaintiff's true claim was invasion

of privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

This

case does not fit any fraud analysis.
POINT A-2
THE JURY'S VERDICT DENYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Any punitive damage award requires a finding that the
defendant violated plaintiff's rights either recklessly or
6

intentionally.

In this case, the undisputed evidence showed no

such conduct.

Inteltech was diligent in obtainin legal advice in

Utah and other states regarding the legality of its methods.

It

received opinions from all attorneys involved to the effect that
its methods did not infringe on anyone's rights.

If Inteltech

violated any right, there is nothing to suggest that such a
violation was a knowing or reckless act.

To the contrary, quite

the opposite was proved.
POINT B-l
THE JURY WAS CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THAT FRAUD CLAIMS
IN THIS STATE ARE RESTRICTED TO ECONOMIC LOSS.
It is the general rule in the United States that a
claim of fraud must be a claim for economic or pecuniary loss and
not for emotional distress.

The only Utah cases of record

regarding fraud deal with pecuniary loss.

Fraud is not a

"personal injury tort."
Plaintiff has filed a lengthy string citation
attempting to support the claim that a fraud claim may be made
for strictly emotional distress damages. A review of those cases
indicates that most are based either on special statutes, or
special circumstances.

Those cases that do deal with emotional

distress damages under fraud appear to be blurring the

7

distinction between a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and fraud.
This court has previously expressed its concern with
emotional damage claims.

Claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress are limited to the most egregious
circumstances as accords with the Restatement of Torts (Second),
Section 46.

Plaintiff's attempt to evade this restriction by

calling this action a fraud claim should not be countenanced.
Her claim failed to meet the standards for an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and was
dismissed at the trial level.

This court should not expand fraud

claims to include generalized emotional distress actions.

Even

if it were to accept the invitation to expand fraud claims to
include emotional distress claims, it should apply the same rules
as are applied in intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims and thus dismiss plaintiff's fraud claim herein.
POINT B-2
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OP PLAINTIFF'S
PSYCHOLCOGICAL PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT WAS COMPELLED
BY THE LAW AND WAS NECESSARY TO A PROPER EVALUATION
OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM.
It is undisputed that plaintiff had a lengthy history
of psychological problems and trauma dating from her days as a
child.

She had been routinely abused by men in her family.
8

Plaintiff attempted in this case to make a claim for emotional
distress damages but hold all evidence of her other psychological
problems away from the jury.
Those problems were particularly relevant in this case
to demonstrate the true cause of her emotional problems; how the
Inteltech investigation would have affected her, if at all; how
her psychological problems affect her ability to recall regarding
the Inteltech investigation; and the fact that even though she
was receiving psychological counseling at the time, the Inteltech
investigation was of such a de minimus effect in her life that
she never mentioned it to any psychological counselor.
Once plaintiff makes a claim for emotional distress
damages and puts her credibility at issue before the jury, all
information relevant to her credibility and emotional state
becomes relevant.
Plaintiff's suggestion that this issue was somehow
abused by defendants is ridiculous.

The only prejudice naturally

flowing from the admission of this evidence was prejudice in
plaintiff's favor.

9

POINT B-3
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DID NOT RECONVENE THE JURY
FOR CONSIDERATION OF DAMAGE AMOUNTS.
Plaintiff would like to pick and choose those aspects
of the Judge7s JNOV which will be upheld.

She would like to

retain Judge Wilkinson's liability finding but return for a shot
at greater damages to a jury.

When requesting this unusual

relief from the court, plaintiff's attorney was unable to cite
any reason to support it.

Utah case law makes clear that in a

personal injury case, such an order is not appropriate.

The

issues regarding plaintiff's injuries and liability in this case
are so intertwined that it is inappropriate to attempt to
separate them by partial order.
ARGUMENT
(Section A)
POINT A-l
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
CONSEQUENTLY, NO JNOV MAY BE GRANTED.
Plaintiff's brief has not disputed the clear case law
cited by appellants regarding the standards for the granting of a
JNOV.

As pointed out in defendant's initial brief, a JNOV may

only be granted if there is a total absence of competent evidence
supporting the verdict.
1987)).

(King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah

A court is not entitled to substitute its own personal
10

feelings regarding the evidence and the believability of the
witnesses for the jury's assessment and weighing of the evidence.
(Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah
1979) .
Unfortunately, in granting the JNOV in this case, that
is exactly what Judge Wilkinson did.

In his decision, Judge

Wilkinson stated:
. . . It was highly offensive to this court
for the defendants to do what they did to
Jackie Turner.
(Court's Ruling, p. 20.)

(Emphasis added.)

The simple fact is that the jury disagreed unanimously.

It found

Inteltech's conduct to be appropriate.
A.

The Jury's Verdict of No Cause of Action on Plaintiff's
Invasion of Privacy Claim was Well Supported.
Plaintiff took no exception to the instruction to the

jury regarding the standard for an invasion of privacy case.
(Tr. 663.)

That instruction was based upon the Restatement of

Torts (Second), Section 652(b) and Comment D to that section.

In

essence, the instruction provided a two-prong test for an
invasion of privacy claim:

(1) did the defendant intrude on the

solitude or seclusion of plaintiff or her private concerns? and
(2) was there a substantial intrusion that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person?
11

The jury quite clearly determined that the Inteltech
investigation was not a substantial intrusion which was highly
offensive.
The visits involved in the Inteltech investigation were
of very brief duration.

They involved coming to the front step

of the home, speaking on the telephone, or speaking in the front
room or kitchen of the home after being invited in.
were not calculated to harass in any manner.

The visits

The total time

involved was 2 hours and 8 minutes spread over 5 casual visits.
The jury determined that this was not a substantial intrusion.
The jury further found that this was not "highly offensive" to
them as reasonable persons.
The issues of reasonableness, degree of intrusion, and
offensiveness are clearly issues of fact within the special
province of the jury.

(Wyclais v. Guardian Title of Utah. 780

P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989)).

The jury's finding in this case

cannot be ignored.
In her responsive brief, plaintiff has cited several
cases from other jurisdictions regarding invasion of privacy.

A

review of those cases, however, shows that to the extent that
they relate to this action, they support Inteltech's position.
They support the rule that the determination of what is
"outrageous" or "highly offensive" conduct is a jury question and
12

not an issue to be taken away from the jury by the court.
Furthermore, each of the cases involves substantially different
facts from those in the instant case.

Contrary to plaintiffs

argument, these cases do not support a determination in this case
that Inteltech's conduct was "highly offensive" as a matter of
law.
The case of Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1987)
involved an invasion into plaintiff's home with television
cameras.

The plaintiff's husband was dying of a heart attack and

paramedics had been called.

An NBC camera crew, without

receiving permission of any kind, barged into the home and
entered plaintiff's bedroom where her dying husband lay.
scenes were taken of his distress.

He ultimately died.

Graphic
NBC

thereafter broadcast this footage on several occasions on nightly
news.

The California Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment

of dismissal.

It determined that the conduct of barging into a

bedroom and broadcasting a dying man's suffering on television
could be considered by a jury to be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person."

It reversed the summary judgment so a jury

could decide.
It is important to note that the court in the Miller
case did not determine as a matter of law that the right to
privacy had been violated.

It simply determined that there was a
13

jury issue.

The invasion in that case was clearly far more

severe than the invasion in this case.

Scenes of the stricken

man in his bedroom were broadcast nationally.

Nevertheless, even

in that circumstance, the court did not grant judgment as a
matter of law as is requested here.

The court turned to the

wisdom of the jury.
The case of Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Missouri
App. 1987) involves the same result.

In the Hester case,

plaintiffs allege they had consulted about private family matters
with their minister.

They had understood that their

communications with the minister were privileged.

They alleged

that their privacy had been violated because the minister
publicly defamed their family and branded them as child abusers.
The Missouri Appellate Court reversed a judgment on the pleadings
which had dismissed the complaint.
trial by jury of the privacy claim.

By doing so, it required
There is nothing in the case

which suggests that the court was determining as a matter of law
that judgment must be entered on the privacy claim.

The court

simply was referring that issue for jury determination.

As with

the NBC case, the Hester case involves conduct dramatically more
egregious than that in the instant case.

Nevertheless, the court

required a jury to determine whether the conduct violated the
right to privacy, it did not substitute its own opinion.
14

The other two cases on which plaintiff relies are the
Victorian case of Demay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), and
State v. Hyem, 630 P.2d 202 (Mont. 1981).

The Demay case

involved an unmarried man obtaining access to a married woman's
bedroom and observing her during childbirth on the understanding
that he was a doctor when, in fact, he was not.
involve a reversal of a jury decision.

It did not

It involves an intrusion

far in excess of that presented in the instant case.
The Hyem case is a criminal search and seizure case.
The decision clearly states it is based upon a special provision
of the Montana Constitution as well as criminal search and
seizure law.

It simply does not apply.

A review of plaintiff's cases reaffirms the proposition
that the question of whether the conduct involved reaches the
level of a "substantial and outrageous" intrusion must be left to
the jury.

In this case, the jury decided and found adversely to

plaintiff.

Judge Wilkinson's substitution of his personal views

for the judgment of the jury is inappropriate and must be
reversed.
Additionally, the first prong of the standard for
invasion of privacy: intrusion into private affairs, is not
present in this case. While it is true that Inteltech personnel
15

conversed with plaintiff, there is no allegation that the matters
discussed were in any way of a private nature.

Plaintiff was

willing to freely discuss them with a stranger, whom she believed
was a salesman.

Inteltech was simply attempting to obtain

information regarding the employment of plaintiff's husband.
Plaintiff's husband having made a worker's compensation claim had
impliedly consented to a fair and reasonable investigation of
that claim.

Ellenbera v. Pinckerton's, 188 S.E.2d 911 (Geo. App.

1972) . The jury determined that the investigation made in this
case was reasonable.
B.

The Jury's Verdict of No Cause of Action for
Fraud is Well Supported by the Evidence.
Plaintiff's brief is correct in pointing out that the

most obvious deficiency in her claim of fraud is her failure to
prove any out of pocket damages.

As noted in the Factual

Statement, Judge Wilkinson and the jury agreed that plaintiff had
not established any lost wages.

Although plaintiff spent

approximately two hours in contact with Inteltech, there was no
evidence whatsoever that she would have spent any of that time
gainfully employed.

The evidence showed that she was at home at

the time tending children or even sleeping.
missing any work.

16

She certainly wasn't

Judge Wilkinson, however, apparently concluded that
plaintiff was believable in her testimony that she paid $20 to a
babysitter.

The jury disagreed.

The jury rejected the fraud

claim.
As pointed out in Inteltech's initial brief, there was
ample reason to question plaintiff's credibility.

This included

her psychological difficulties, her failure to report any of the
traumatic occurrences she claimed to her psychotherapists, her
willingness to lie to worker's compensation adjusters regarding
her husband's employment, the conflicts between her testimony and
the testimony of the Inteltech personnel, and the conflicts
between her testimony and her husband's testimony.
Furthermore, even if plaintiff had arranged to pay a
babysitter approximately $20 to watch her children during a
meeting with Inteltech, there was no evidence offered as to why
she could not have simply canceled the babysitter after the
meeting was canceled.

There can be no claim for fraud if the

damages caused could have been avoided. Conder v. Williams &
Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987).
Plaintiff's evidence of pecuniary loss resulting from
Inteltech's action was scanty at best.

It did not meet the

"clear and convincing" standard or even a preponderance standard.
The jury found plaintiff to be not credible and did not believe
17

that damage had been proved.

A question of credibility of a

witness is a question for the jury and not one to be taken away
from the jury by a trial judge.
In addition, the jury's verdict is supported by a
failure on plaintiff's part to demonstrate other factors
necessary to establish a fraud claim in addition to the lack of
pecuniary damage.

Plaintiff has presented no case law regarding

a fraud case that even remotely resembles that presented here.
The fact is that Inteltech's representations that they would
provide free products were all true.

Plaintiff agreed to speak

with Inteltech people and received the products as promised.
Mrs. Turner received everything that was promised by Inteltech.
The compensation, which she was willing to accept, were the free
products that she received.
All of the various fraud cases which plaintiff has
cited in her brief involve a fraud committed in a situation in
which the plaintiff was fraudulently led to enter into a
transaction of some kind (marriage, adoption, real estate, etc.)
in which he received less consideration than he had been told
would be received.

This action, however, is totally different,

Inteltech never promised plaintiff anything that they did not
deliver.

The inducement to converse with Inteltech was the

promise of free products.

The products were delivered.
18

Plaintiff received exactly what she was led to believe she would
receive.
This case simply does not fit into a fraud analysis.
It is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
not a claim for a misrepresentation leading one into an unfair
transaction.
The fraud claim in this case should have been dismissed
prior to trial.

Even so, the jury did not believe the plaintiff.

The fact that Judge Wilkinson found her believable does not
justify ignoring the wisdom of the eight members of the jury.
POINT A-2
THE JURY'S VERDICT DENYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES WAS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The evidence presented by Inteltech was undisputed in
showing that all inquiries it had made with legal counsel
indicated that its method of investigation was lawful and
appropriate.

Inteltech received direction from a Utah attorney

in this particular investigation.

(Tr. 236-237.)

Previously,

Inteltech had sought and received legal approval from another
local Utah attorney indicating the technique was lawful. (Tr.
112-118.)

Inteltech had been retained by agencies of the State

of Utah, including law enforcement agencies, all of which
confirmed that its technique was lawful. (Tr. 101, 115, 119.)
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In her responsive brief, plaintiff does not deny the
fact that these legal opinions were received by Inteltech.
Inteltech never received any legal opinion to indicate that its
technique was not lawful.

Notwithstanding this evidence,

plaintiff's brief claims that Inteltech's action was in knowing
disregard of Jackie Turner's rights.
logical sense and has no support.

Such a position makes no

Inteltech did the right thing,

Inteltech inquired of attorneys and received their opinions
before engaging in business in Utah.

Inteltech had every reason

to believe that its technique was lawful.

If Inteltech violated

any right (which the jury said it did not), there is nothing to
suggest that such a violation was knowing or reckless.

The

opposite was proved.
POINT B-l
THE JURY WAS CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THAT FRAUD CLAIMS IN THIS STATE
ARE RESTRICTED TO ECONOMIC LOSS.
Plaintiff apparently concedes in her brief that there
are no Utah cases permitting recovery from mental anguish for a
claim based on fraud.

Utah case law has stated consistently that

the measure of damages in a fraud case is "the benefit of the
bargain rule."

That is the difference between the value of what

was promised and the value of what was received.
, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).
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Duaan v. Jones

This rule is consistent with the longstanding majority
of decisions and the basic theory of fraud itself.
a "personal injury" tort.
economic deception.

Fraud is not

It is a cause of action involving

The losses involved are the economic losses

resulting from that deception.

The general rule is as follows:

But even if a broad range of damages is to be
permitted in cases of intentional fraud, it
must be remembered that deceit is an
economic, not a dignitary tort, and resembles
in the interest it seeks to protect, a
contract claim more than a tort claim. For
this reason, though strong men may cry at the
loss of money, separate recovery for mental
anguish is usually denied in deceit cases,
just as it is denied in contract cases,
simply because emotional distress, though
resulting naturally from many frauds, is not
one of the interests the law ordinarily seeks
to protect in deceit cases.
Dobbs, Remedies, Fraud & Deceit, Section 9.2 (1973).
added.)

(Emphasis

This rule of damages for fraud is further supported by
the Restatement of Torts (Second), Section 549. This section
defines the damages available for fraudulent misrepresentations
as follows:
Measure of Damages for Fraudulent
Misrepresentation. (1) The recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to
recover as damages in an action of deceit
against the maker the pecuniary loss due him
of which the misrepresentation is legal
cause, including (a) the difference between
the value of what he has received in the
transaction and its purchase price or other
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value given for it; and (b) the pecuniary
loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of
the recipient's reliance upon the
misrepresentation. (2) The recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation in a business
transaction is also entitled to recover
additional damages sufficient to the give him
the benefit of his contract with the maker,
if these damages are proved with reasonable
certainty. (Emphasis added.)
This basic rule is supported by cases from neighboring
jurisdictions.

See. Umphrey v. Sprinkel. 682 P.2d 1247 (Idaho

1983); Ellis. Jr. v. Crockett. 451 P.2d 814 (Hawaii 1969) and
cases cited therein.

Cases outside the Pacific Reporter

jurisdiction have similarly denied recovery of emotional and
mental anguish damages in fraud claims.

See. Walse v. Ingersoll-

Rand Company. 656 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1981) and cases cited
therein.

("The general rule is that fraud is an economic tort

and, thus, protects only pecuniary losses.")

656 F.2d 370.

The rule of law cited is consistent with plaintiff's
lead case from her brief, Dizick v. Umpqua Community College. 599
P.2d 444 (Ore. 1979).

The Dizick case involved a claim of a

student in a community college to the effect that he had been
deceived with regard to the specific training he would receive
upon signing up for courses.
fact, been deceived.

The court found that he had, in

The damages awarded were pecuniary damages.
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He received damages compensating for lost income that resulted
from his attendance at the school based upon the deceit.
Plaintiffs brief further attempts to rely upon Prosser
& Keeton, The Law of Torts, Chapter 18. Plaintiff includes a
quote from the Prosser text in her brief.

The quote, however, is

a combination of phrases which are separated by approximately two
pages of text in the original.

A full and fair reading of

Prosser's section gives no indication that Prosser is rejecting
the general rule regarding fraud damages.

The consequential

damages referred to are further economic consequential damages.
Prosser gives several examples at page 767 such as the loss of
goods in a fire and the loss of investment in a business.
Prosser does recognize the Vermont case of Vezina v. Soliere, 152
A 798 which was a claim for personal injuries caused by a horse
that was fraudulently represented to be gentle.
Plaintiff has provided a lengthy string cite of cases
from various jurisdictions in her brief claiming that each of the
cases stands for the proposition that emotional damages may be
recovered in a fraud claim.
support that proposition.

Most of the cases simply do not
Several of the cases such as those

from California and New Hampshire rely on particular civil code
sections or other rules of law unique to those states. Rosener
v. Sears, 168 Cal.Rptr. 237 (1980); Spraaue v. Sanders, 174
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Cal.Rptr. 608 (1981); Crowley v. Global Realty, 474 A.2d 1056
(N.H. 1984).Several involve considerations of punitive damage or
physical damage (Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 N.Y.2d 139 (1926);
Ridout-Brown Service, Inc. v. Hollaway, 397 S.2d 125) and several
deal with fraud in inducement of marriage or adoption.

Burr v.

Board of County Commissioners of Stark County, 491 N.E.2d 1101
(Ohio 1986); Holcombe v. Whitaker, 318 S.2d 289 (Ala. 1975);
Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.Y. 675 (N.Y. 1933).
Those cases cited which do involve awards for mental
anguish appear to confuse or blur the distinction between a cause
of action for fraud and a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

See, e.g., First National Bank

of New Castle v. Acra, 462 N.E.2d 1345 (Ind. App. 1984) where the
court specifically based its decision on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress standard.

Id. at 350.

Similarly, See, Baker v. American States Insurance, 428 N.E.2d
1342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) and McGregor v. Mommer, 714 P.2d 536
(Mont. 1986).
As noted above, there is no case in Utah indicating
that Utah would split from the majority rule and permit recovery
of emotional distress damages in a fraud action.

This court has

on several occasions expressed its concern with emotional damages
claims and reluctance to expand and widen the basis of liability
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for such claims.

In the case of First Security Bank of Utah v.

JBJ Feed Yards , 353 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), the court stated:
Damages for mental anguish are an extreme
remedy which should be dispensed with
caution.
In this case, plaintiff is attempting to convert a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress into a
fraud claim.

In fact, as originally filed, plaintiff's Complaint

requested relief upon the theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

That cause of action was dismissed and

plaintiff has not appealed.
In evaluating the standards for an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, this court has adopted
the Restatement of Torts (Second), Section 46 in the case of
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

That section

provides:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm. (Emphasis added.)
The official comments to this section go in more depth
in explaining the intent of this section.

Comment D states:

The cases thus far decided have found
liability only where defendants' conduct has
been extreme and outrageous. It has not been
enough that the defendant has acted with an
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intent which is tortious or even criminal, or
that he has intended to inflict emotional
distress, or even that his conduct has been
characterized by "malice" or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff
to punitive damages for another tort.
Liability has been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and be regarded
as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.
Plaintiff's attempt to avoid the strict standards of
intentional infliction of emotional distress law by pleading an
emotional distress claim as a fraud claim is inappropriate.
Plaintiff initially made the proper claim with regard to her
emotional distress claims and the trial court dismissed it.

This

court should decline plaintiff's invitation to bypass the
established law of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

POINT B-2
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OP PLAINTIFF'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT WAS COMPELLED BY THE LAW AND
WAS NECESSARY TO A PROPER EVALUATION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM.
At Point 6 of her brief, plaintiff claims that the
evidence of her many psychological problems and treatment should
have been excluded by the Court.

It is not clear from the brief

whether plaintiff is claiming that the evidence regarding her
psychological history was irrelevant or if she is admitting that
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the evidence is relevant and claiming that it was more
prejudicial than probative.
A.

Relevance,
A review of the facts of this case clearly shows that

the evidence was relevant to the jury's consideration.
Specifically, it was relevant at a minimum in the following
considerations:
1.

An evaluation of how plaintiff's apparent emotional

state in the court room resulted from other causes and not from
causes related to the Inteltech investigation.
2.

How the Inteltech investigation would have affected

a person of plaintiff's unusual mental state.
3.

How plaintiff's mental history affects her ability

to recall and testify truthfully and accurately with regard to
the events surrounding the investigation.
4.

The extent to which plaintiff felt sufficient

emotional impact from the investigation to mention it (or not
mention it) to her mental health counselors.
5.

How plaintiff's mental condition affected her

ability to accurately describe her emotional reaction, if any.

As noted in the Fact Statement in defendant's initial
brief, plaintiff never related anything regarding the Inteltech
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investigation to any of her various psychological counselors.
This was true even though she was undergoing psychological
treatment throughout the relevant time period and was a resident
patient at a psychological hospital at the time of the trial.
She never once indicated to any of those counselors and other
professionals that the event involving Inteltech had in any way
caused her emotional strain, disruption or other problems.
Furthermore, her records demonstrated that her
counselors believed that she was unable to accurately relate her
psychological and emotional history and events in her life.
Finally, the records demonstrated why plaintiff appeared and
behaved as she did at trial.
In the absence of the records and testimony regarding
her history, the jury would have been unable to understand
plaintiff's testimony in context.
Plaintiff would like to pick and choose what evidence
regarding her psychological well being goes before the jury.

Her

argument that she can simply explain what she wants considered
and all other aspects have to be kept out of evidence has no
support in the law.

At such time as a plaintiff makes a claim

for psychological injury and emotional upset, her privilege
against the discovery of information regarding that history is
waived.

Utah Code Ann., Section 58-25A-8(2)(f).
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Where the patient or client, by alleging
mental or emotional damages in litigation,
puts his mental state at issue.
When she proceeds to make a claim at trial for mental
injury, all information relevant to her mental state is relevant.

Probative Value,
Plaintiff's brief makes the totally unsubstantiated
claim that her psychological history was used to somehow confuse
the jury.

She accuses the defendants of using an unfair tactic.

Such an allegation is ridiculous.
The fact of the matter is that defendant's counsel
thought long and hard before submitting this evidence in court.
The obvious impact of a great deal of the evidence was to
engender great sympathy for the plaintiff who had been victimized
by various men in her family for years.

Defendant's counsel had

substantial and real concerns that placing such information
before the jury could arouse sympathy in the court and jury
causing them to favor the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, the evidence was critical in discrediting
plaintiff's testimony.

Plaintiff wished to simply testify to the

effect that she had been caused great emotional upset by the
Inteltech investigation and leave it at that.

She did not wish

the jury to know of the true cause of her emotional disturbance.
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She further did not wish the jury to know of her inability to
testify with accuracy regarding her emotional feelings and
various events in her life.

Finally, and understandably, she

didn't wish the jury to know that the Inteltech investigation was
such a de minimum event in her life that she had never had
occasion to mention it to any of her many counselors and
psychiatrists.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading of the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
(Emphasis added.)
The instant case doesn't even approach this
"substantial" standard.

There is no evidence of any prejudice

confusion or misleading whatsoever.

It simply defies logic for

plaintiff's new attorney to suggest that some confusion was
caused by this evidence.

Any prejudice aroused by this evidence

was in plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff's suggestion now, that the

admission of that evidence somehow biased the jury against her,
is illogical and wrong.

30

POINT B-3
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DID NOT RECONVENE THE JURY FOR
CONSIDERATION OF DAMAGE AMOUNTS.
After the jury verdict was returned, plaintiff's former
counsel asked for a conference at bar. At that time, he
requested that the trial judge send the jury out for a specific
determination of damages.

Plaintiff made this request

notwithstanding the fact that the jury had been instructed not to
consider damages if they found no liability.

Plaintiff had not

objected to this instruction and only raised this unusual request
after receiving an adverse verdict.

The judge rejected that

request.
Subsequently, at the hearing on her motion for JNOV,
plaintiff requested that the judge only rule with regard to
liability and order a new trial as to damages.
rejected that approach.

Judge Wilkinson

The judge specifically asked plaintiff's

counsel for an explanation of why the damage issue should go the
jury:
The Court:

Why does it have to go to the
jury?

Mr. Jensen:

I don't know, I don't know,
Judge.

(Transcript of Hearing, p. 19.)
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Although defendants strongly disagree with Judge
Wilkinson's decision to grant a JNOV, Utah law clearly supports
his determination that any JNOV order must be a complete order.
It is not appropriate in a case such as this to split issues and
grant a half of a JNOV.

Highland v. St. Mark's, 427 P.2d 736

(Utah 1967) and Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. of
App. 1988).
The Highland case involved a medical malpractice claim
alleging personal injuries.
cause of action.

The jury returned a verdict of no

The trial judge attempted to do exactly what is

suggested here, that is, he found liability but ordered a new
trial to be restricted to the issue of damages.

The Utah Supreme

Court reversed that decision and returned the matter for a new
trial on all issues.

The Court emphasized that in a personal

injury action, the issues of liability and damage are so
intertwined that it is not appropriate to split the issues.
court commented:
There are undoubtedly some instances where
limiting a trial to the issue of damages only
may be justified, as our rules allow. But
courts generally do not look with favor upon
such a restriction. The reasons why this is
so in personal injury actions are well
exemplified in this case. The questions
relating to plaintiff's injury, how it
happened, who was at fault, and the pain and
injury occasioned thereby, are so
intermingled that if there is to be a new
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The

trial, in fairness to both parties, it should
be on all issues.
427 P.2d at 738.
In the instant case, the facts supporting whatever
damages or emotional upset the plaintiff claims are inextricably
interwoven with the facts of the Inteltech investigation itself.
The liability issues and damage issues rest on the same facts.
Under the rule of the Highland case and the Mikkelsen case, it
would be inappropriate to grant half of a JNOV and then hold a
new trial with regard to the damage issues only.
If Judge Wilkinson was going to grant a JNOV and ignore
the jury's determination, under the rules it is appropriate for
him to grant a complete judgment.

Plaintiff cannot pick and

choose those aspects of his judgment with which she is pleased.
CONCLUSION
The jury in this case deliberated and reached a
unanimous verdict adverse to plaintiff.

There was certainly

evidence to support its finding that no invasion of privacy had
occurred and that plaintiff had failed to prove fraud.
Plaintiff's evidence as to the severity of the claimed intrusion
into her life and as to her damages resulting from the claimed
fraud all rested almost entirely on her own testimony.
simply found her to be not a credible witness.
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The jury

There was nothing in the conduct of the Inteltech
investigation that the jury found to be highly offensive.
The fact that Judge Wilkinson disagreed with the jury
does not justify his entry of a JNOV.

A JNOV may only be entered

if there is a complete absence of evidence to support the
verdict.

In this case, the verdict was well supported.
Accordingly, Judge Wilkinson's JNOV must be overturned.

This case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of
judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
DATED /*2fi

day of 04£~>*_.. ^

, 1991.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

ROBERT^. SIRENS
Attorneys for Oak Norton, Inteldex
Corporation dba Inteltech
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